Skip to main content

Guadalcanal: The Goettge Patrol

The 1st Marine Division

Emblem of the 1st Marine Division

Emblem of the 1st Marine Division

At the start of WWII, most of America’s military forces were relatively unfamiliar (one might say ignorant) of the Japanese language and military culture, and badly underestimated Japanese military potential. The United States had relatively little in terms of solid military intelligence concerning Japanese leadership, training and tactics when World War II started.

From the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 through August 1942, the military forces of the United States were on a primarily defensive posture in the southwest Pacific. Tactical and logistical priority was given to the war in Europe.

In the Pacific, the Doolittle Raid of 18 April 1942 was a carrier-borne attack on Tokyo by B25 pilots of the 17th Bomber Group, led by Lt. Col. James Doolittle from the flight deck of the carrier, USS Hornet. The mission did not cause significant damage, but dispelled the belief that the Japanese homeland was inviolate and it demonstrated that Japan was vulnerable to attack. Though the raid caused no damage to military targets, the accomplishment provided a needed boost to American morale, shook the faith of the Japanese people in their military leaders (who had assured them no enemy would successfully attack the homeland) and, from a tactical perspective, caused the Japanese to withdraw its carrier force from the Indian Ocean to better protect the homeland.

Guadalcanal - 7 August 1942 The Marines came ashore at Lunga Point

Guadalcanal - 7 August 1942 The Marines came ashore at Lunga Point

The invasion of Guadalcanal in the southern Solomon Islands on 7 August 1942, code-named Operation Watchtower, was a necessity because the Japanese were constructing an airstrip on Guadalcanal, threatening shipping and operating within reach of Port Moresby and the Australian east coast. Guadalcanal is approximately 90 miles in length, and oriented on a primarily east-west orientation. Up to this point, the Japanese offensive in the Southwest Pacific was unsuccessfully opposed by the Allies. The defenses of Australia were weakened by a shortage of military manpower because most of the Australian and New Zealand troops were committed to other theaters of warfare.

1st MarDiv assaults the beach at Lunga Point

1st MarDiv assaults the beach at Lunga Point

Elements of the 1st Marine Division (infantry and artillery regiments and supporting battalions) existed since 1911, but were organized into a division (i.e., three infantry regiments with artillery, armor, combat engineers, headquarters and specialized supporting elements, between 15,000 to 20,000 personnel ) in early February 1941. The Division, as a whole - at the time, about 16,000 personnel - was committed to the invasion of Guadalcanal as its baptism of fire, and it was comprised primarily of recently trained Marines, typically equipped with the accurate Springfield 1903 rifle, chambered for the .30-’06 cartridge and the assortment of infantry small arms that were prevalent in the Corps' Table of Equipment at the time.

Later, on 13 October 1942, the U.S. Army’s 164th Division arrived, equipped with the new semiautomatic M1 Garand rifles, which were a significant improvement. Loaded with an 8-shot clip, the Garand also fired the .30-'06 cartridge but was capable of a much heavier volume of fire than the bolt action Springfield 1903 and 1903A3 riles, which had 5-shot magazines and were slower to cycle.

Japanese resist the advancing Marines.

Japanese resist the advancing Marines.

Guadalcanal marked a turning point from a defensive to an offensive posture by Allied forces, perceived up to this point as weak, unmotivated and inferior by Japanese military commanders, who instilled in their troops that victory over these soft Allied troops was a certainty. Initially surprised by the invading Allies, the Japanese were pushed back from the airfield leaving equipment and supplies behind. That was fortuitous, because the advancing Marines were undersupplied and had to rely on captured Japanese provisions.

The vessels on which the Marines' supplies were stored were directed to leave the area when Japanese aircraft and naval vessels threatened. The Marines ashore felt they'd been abandoned and regarded as "expendable" when their supplies sailed away, but they found Japanese supplies of maggot-infested rice and oats. Under the worst circumstances, Marines (as a culture) typically make a great effort to adapt, improvise and overcome.

The almost-completed airfield was taken and a perimeter established by the Marines. The captured airfield was renamed Henderson Field, in honor of Maj. Lofton Henderson, a pilot who was the first Marine aviator to be killed in the Battle of Midway. Today, it's known as the Honiara International Airport. The Japanese made several attempts to retake the field between August and November 1942. Unable to retake it, they tried shelling it to deny its use to the Allies.

The Japanese had not battled U.S. Marines before, but assumed they would provide no challenge to the forces of Japan. In the clash of arms that followed, both sides were able to take better measure of each other. The Allies had surprisingly little information on the Japanese forces they opposed, so the effort to gather intelligence was critical.

Frank B. Goettge, football fullback

Frank B. Goettge, football fullback

Col. Frank Bryan Goettge was a Marine veteran with service since the First World War. Born on December 30, 1895, in Canton, Ohio, he attended the University of Ohio and played freshman football for one year prior to enlisting in the Marine Corps in 1917. 1

In 1918, he was commissioned as a second lieutenant and served with the 5th Marine Regiment against the Germans at St. Mihiel in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. He later served in occupation duty at Segendorf, Germany, where he was a fullback with the Second Division, American Expeditionary Forces. At Quantico, where he enrolled in the Company Officers Course, he won greater acclaim as a football player and dominated the field as a fullback.

From 1921 to 1924, Goettge helped carry the All Marines team to 40 victories and two ties. Sports writer Walter Camp said of him, “Today, for today at least, I saw my greatest all-time football player; for today at least greater that Jim Thorpe on a good day. The big fellow’s name is Frank Goettge.” 2

Lt. Col. Goettge, second from right.

Lt. Col. Goettge, second from right.

After WWI, his assignments sent him to Haiti, Hawaii, and Peking. He was the commanding officer of the Marines aboard the battleship, USS Pennsylvania, and commanding officer of the Marine Detachment at Annapolis, Maryland. Prior to the invasion, in June 1941, Lt. Col. Frank B. Goettge was assigned to the 1st Marine Division as its intelligence officer, and he was promoted to colonel as he assumed those responsibilities. 3

Scroll to Continue

The Marines conducted an unopposed landing on Guadalcanal at Lunga Point on August 7, 1942. The weather was poor and, as the first offensive action against the Japanese, the landing initially took the Japanese defenders by surprise. The advancing Marines overran a Japanese tent camp and several prisoners were taken.

Laborers taken prisoner in the rapid advance and patrol of the vicinity of the airfield.

Laborers taken prisoner in the rapid advance and patrol of the vicinity of the airfield.

Hungry for intelligence, the Marines’ best method of gathering information was to send out patrols. Within several days, the Marines had rounded up a number of Japanese Navy personnel, Korean conscripts and local laborers who had been assigned to build the airfield. Among the prisoners was a Japanese warrant officer, Tsuneto Sakado, who was initially uncooperative during questioning; however, the Japanese did not have a Code of Conduct for prisoners, assuming that anyone taken prisoner would commit suicide, so the warrant officer had no guidelines for interrogation.

The Marine translator who questioned him, Marine Lt. Merle Ralph Cory, spoke fluent Japanese but initially received little cooperation from Sakado, so he provided some medicinal brandy for the Japanese warrant officer and the prisoner became more relaxed and compliant. The warrant officer told Lt. Cory that a number of Japanese conscript laborers and engineering personnel west of the Matanikau River were hungry, sick, demoralized and willing to surrender, and another prisoner corroborated that statement. 4

Col. Goettge with captured Japanese currency. This is the last known photo taken of him.

Col. Goettge with captured Japanese currency. This is the last known photo taken of him.

Col. Goettge considered these reports in light of the fact that many Japanese prisoners were surprisingly forthcoming in questioning. They were not instructed on a Code of Conduct if captured because it was assumed they would not be taken alive or would commit suicide, so they discussed details and issues that would not ordinarily be provided by prisoners today.

Based primarily on these prisoners’ information, Goettge promptly organized a 25-man patrol with a plan to land west of the Matanikau River, follow the estuary upstream, bivouac for the night and proceed east to the Lunga perimeter in the effort to make contact with the Japanese who were willing to surrender. 5

As the patrol was assembled, Col. Goettge and Capt. Ringer of Brookline, MA, were warned by Col. W.J. Whaling, executive officer of the 5th Marine Regiment, that the Japanese were aggressively defending the area between Point Cruz and the mouth of the Matanikau River, so Col. Whaling suggested a landing west of Point Cruz. 6

Despite the warning, the Goettge patrol boarded a tank lighter, a vessel larger than a Higgins boat designed to transport tracked vehicles, heavy equipment, troops to shore. Col. Goettge was accompanied by Lt. Cory (translator), Lt. Cmdr. Malcolm Pratt (regimental surgeon), Capt. Ringer, First Sergeant Custer, and twenty Marines. They also brought the Japanese prisoner, Tsunteto Sakado. Custer tied a rope around Sakado's neck and led him aboard the tank lighter like an animal on a leash. 7

The patrol shoved off at 1800 (6PM) and proceeded west; however, a flare was sighted to the east and Goettge interpreted it as a signal to return, so the lighter returned to Kukum. They left again at 2100 hrs (9PM) and headed west of the Matanikau River. Before reaching shore, the tank lighter ran aground. The coxswain reversed power and tried repeatedly and successfully to back away, but powering the engines made a very audible noise.

The battle for Henderson Field was hotly contested.

The battle for Henderson Field was hotly contested.

As it developed, the patrol’s landing was made on the very beach that Goettge was warned against, and it is believed that operating in darkness and unable to discern landmarks, the tank lighter motored past (west) of the mouth of the Matanikau River. As the tank lighter approached the beach, the Japanese prisoner protested, "Iie, iie! (No, No!), but his protests were disregarded or misunderstood. 8

The vessel made it to the beach and the Marines disembarked with their prisoner, but the Japanese infantry had heard the noises made by the tank lighter and organized on a coral plateau about 200 yards inland to deal with the Marines.

Col. Goettge ordered his Marines to establish a defensive perimeter, then took Capt. Ringer and First Sergeant Custer with him to scout the jungle and find a bivouac. Soon after Col. Goettge and his men moved forward from their position on the beach, the Japanese opened fire with rifles and machine guns, and Col. Goettge was killed by a bullet to the head, the first to fall. Capt. Ringer and First Sgt. Custer made it back to the Marines’ defensive perimeter. As the firefight began, Caltrider was convinced they'd been led into a trap and, without hesitation, he turned and shot Sakado in the head, then tried to return fire on the Japanese troops and create a defensible position. 9

Sgt. Few and two Marines returned to the jungle, located Col. Goettge’s body and confirmed he was dead, then they returned to the Marine position on the beach. As they withdrew from Goettge’s body, they were confronted by Japanese soldiers. In the darkness, thinking they may have been Marines, Sgt. Few barked, “What’s the password?” In response, he was bayoneted in the arm and leg. In the struggle that ensued, Few was able to wrest the weapon away from his assailant and bayoneted him. Before reaching the Marine perimeter at the beach, Few killed another Japanese soldier with Arndt’s .45 pistol. His own Reising gun, a .45 submachine gun, malfunctioned due to sand in the breach. There are weapons you swear by, but the Reising was one frequently sworn at because it had a reputation as an unreliable weapon. Though it functioned fairly well under ideal conditions, it didn’t perform well in combat.

Col. Frank B. Goettge, shortly after his arrival on Guadalcanal.

Col. Frank B. Goettge, shortly after his arrival on Guadalcanal.

The Marines on the beach were met with intense fire and Lt. Cory was seriously wounded with a bullet to the abdomen. About 30 minutes into the firefight, Sgt. Charles C. “Monk” Arndt was directed to swim back to Marine lines to keep them advised and ask for support. That was a four-mile swim, but Arndt was a fine swimmer. 10

He was admittedly hampered as he swam by his boondockers (field shoes) because the shoelaces were knotted and he was unable to remove them. As he swam east, he stayed close to shore, and he was able to step on the coral reef, but slipped frequently and was cut by jagged edges of the sharp coral. Mindful that the water was shark-infested, he was concerned that the bloody cuts would attract sharks, but wanted desperately to get back as soon as possible.

Near the mouth of the Matanikau River, Arndt was fired upon by a Japanese soldier. Arndt returned fire with his .45 pistol, and believed he hit the soldier because the enemy’s fire abruptly ceased. Arndt found a damaged canoe and, using a board, paddled two miles to American lines. An exhausted Arndt made it back and was challenged for the password, “Lillian”. Passwords often relied on words with “L” in them because the Marines didn’t think the Japanese could pronounce words like “Bilious, Hallelujah, and Polyglot”. Arndt was wrapped in a blanket and he reported the patrol’s situation to headquarters.

Photo reportedly taken during the Guadalcanal campaign.

Photo reportedly taken during the Guadalcanal campaign.

Meanwhile, the Marine patrol’s position was vulnerable. Though crouched behind the roots of some mangrove trees, they lacked adequate cover, and for the next nine hours, the Japanese flanking fire picked off the Marines one by one, and they launched flares to illuminate the Marine position to better direct fire. With each flare, fire against the Marines intensified. First Sgt. Custer was critically wounded. As he was being treated by Dr. Pratt, the doctor was hit. Soon after that first wound, Dr. Pratt was fatally wounded by a bulletin the lower back.

Within the defensive perimeter, Cpl. Herbert E. Benson, "a tall blond kid with a flair for drawing and telling jokes", died as the night wore on and the firing continued. Pfc. Daniel L. Gauntt of Philadelphia PA survived the initial bursts of fire but was kiiled as the fighting continued. Cpl. Jack F. Lyons of Cleveland, OH, specialized in mapping and photography, and died in the exchange of fire. Pvt. Jack B. Kelly enlisted in the Corps on January 30, 1942, and died in the early morning hours of August 13th.

The youngest of the patrol was Pvt. Robert W. Lovelace, 17, an intelligence specialist who enlisted from Berea, Kentucky. Cpl. Stephen Serdula of Corning, NY, was a scout/observer who conducted himself well but died in that action. Sgt. Robert J. Stanfill enlisted in July, 1938, and was airborne qualified as a Paramarine at Lakehurst, NJ, in late 1940. He transferred from the Paramarines to the intelligence section of 5th Marines. None of their remains were ever recovered.

Cpl. Joseph Kashuba had some scouting experience but was chosen for the patrol to make maps of the area for Division intelligence. He also died on the beach that night. Cpl. Aaron L. Gelzer, 23, was a clerk in a grocery store before he enlisted on August 16, 1940. He qualified as a specialist with the Browning Automatic Rifle. Cpl. Henry L. Kowal of Mt. Vernon, NY, also of the intelligence section, accompanied the patrol and was killed that night. Cpl. Robert R. Lyons, 18, worked in the regimental chaplain's office prior to his transfer to the 5th Marine Regiment's intelligence section.

Sgt. David A. Stauffer, 20, was a member of the Intelligence Section. While desperately seeking cover from Japanese machinegun fire, Sgt. Stauffer and Sgt. Arndt were crawling to what looked like a better position, but Sgt. Stauffer was hit and died. Cpl. Theodore E. Raht, 22, enlisted in the Corps in January, 1941, and served in the intelligence section, thus, he was also included in the patrol that night.

Pfc. Blaine G. Walter, 25, of Millersburg, PA, was also assigned to the Intelligence Section, was selected for the patrol and died in the intense exchange of fire. His remains were never recovered, but his personal effects (consisting of a wallet, fountain pen, flashlight, and 2 pairs of socks) were found later. Pfc. John L. Delano, a talented water-color artist from Brookline, MA, one of the best draftsmen in the Division whose skills as a mapmaker were valued, accompanied the patrol to map this previously unexplored area. Pfc. Delano fell to enemy fire and his body was mutilated, but his remains were also not recovered.

As more Marines fell to Japanese fire, Capt. Ringer called for Cpl. William Bainbridge to go back along the beach for help. Bainbridge immediately set off at a run but never made it to friendly lines. The Japanese positions were difficult to pinpoint for return fire. Capt. Ringer ordered another Marine, Cpl. Joseph Spaulding, to make an attempt to swim back, considering the possibility that Sgt. Arndt might not have made it. Spaulding drew fire from the Japanese in his dash into the water, but he shed his dungarees and boondockers and swam underwater as much as possible, changing direction as he did so, as he progressively distanced himself from Japanese fire.

By dawn of August 13th, only four members of the patrol were still alive. Capt. Ringer thought they’d have a better chance in the jungle and decided they’d make a run for it, so Capt. Ringer, Sgt. Few and Sgt. Caltrider moved up about 15 yards and motioned to a corporal behind them. As the corporal moved up, he was cut down by enemy fire. Moments later, Capt. Ringer and Sgt Caltrider fell to machine gun fire.

Only Platoon Sgt. Frank Few managed to make it to the trees, but he reconsidered and decided he’d have a better chance in the water. Hiding among some coconut trees, he witnessed a Japanese soldier standing and firing a rifle into the bodies of the fallen Marines. He drew his pistol, aimed, fired and killed that Japanese soldier, then made a run for the sea and looked back. Japanese troops swarmed the beach, and Lt. Cory (translator) was bayoneted by a Japanese soldier. Other Japanese troops were mutilating the bodies of the dead and wounded Marines with swords and bayonets. 11

The Japanese moved a machine gun to the edge of the beach, closer to the water, and opened fire at Sgt. Few, but the bullets hit to his right and left as they tried to bracket the swimming Marine. Few was wearing a pair of white silk undershorts he’d “liberated” from a Japanese storage shed soon after landing, but they seemed a silvery, fluorescent white as he swam away. Few regretted those skivvies, convinced those shorts provided a better target for the machine gunners. Once beyond that hazard, he was concerned that the sharks would be attracted to those white shorts. Platoon Sgt. Few was the last to escape and survive the Goettge patrol.

Sgt. Denzil Ray Caltrider, KIA

Sgt. Denzil Ray Caltrider, KIA

The three Marines who were sent for help completed their swim. Sgt. Arndt arrived at Marine lines at 0530, Cpl. Spaulding at 0725, and Sgt. Few at 0800. 12

As he emerged from the water at the Marine perimeter, Few was challenged for the password, but the exhausted Marine couldn’t readily respond and was nearly shot by a sentry.

The reports of the three Marines left little hope for rescue of the patrol, but a relief element was sent immediately from A Company, 5th Marines to where it was believed the Goettge patrol had come ashore. They encountered light resistance and were reinforced by Company L. Working their way inland, they were held back by difficult terrain and made it to the site on August 14th, but found no trace of the patrol. 13

On August 19th, a patrol from "I" Company, 5th Marines, found Cpl. Bainbridge's bullet-ridden remains near Kokumbona. He was buried where he was found. Subsequent to August 21, 1942, a patrol led by Lt. W. Sivertsen found a dispatch or medical case belonging to Lt. Cmdr. Pratt and a torn piece of clothing marked with Goettge’s name, but no identifiable remains were found. 14

Ore J. Marion of "L" Company, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment (L/3/5) was involved in the fighting along the Matanikau just a month after the patrol. Monk Arndt was also at the scene, and he pointed to shallow graves and said, "See that arm sticking up, and the riding boot? That's the colonel." The bodies were badly decomposed and unidentifiable by individual features, but Arndt had known Goettge well. 15

Ernest Snowden, also of L/3/5, commented that they had found remains of the Goettge Patrol, but they were dismembered bodies, arms and legs sticking out of the sand, adding, "We didn't bother them, but they were there." 16

Thurman Miller of K/3/5 contributed, "We were crossing the Matanikau River and came across bodies and mutilated body parts. I saw a head roll down to the water and a little wave pushed it up again. This kept repeating. There was also a leg from the knee down with a legging and brand new boondocker boots. A First Sergeant's shirt with the torso still inside. No head or arms. I asked the Lieutenant why we didn't bury the body parts, and he said not to touch them." 17

Officially, the incident was not reported due, in part, to strict censorship during the war and also to spare the relatives. The U.S. Marine Corps reported that no bodies had been recovered, and the men who discovered and witnessed the mutilated bodies were ordered not to speak of it, but word travels quickly. As a result, the Marines were hardened in their combat with the Japanese and fighting increased in bitterness and accelerated violence. 18

U.S. troops continue to come ashore at Guadalcanal.

U.S. troops continue to come ashore at Guadalcanal.

In the clarity of after-action reports, Col. Goettge’s decision to land at that location on the beach, one which he had been warned against, contributed to his death and the loss of 22 Marines on his patrol. His decision to take only 25 Marines into a situation like this, against overwhelming enemy forces on terrain unfavorable to the patrol, has been second-guessed and criticized. I think that is easy in hindsight. His judgment is further questioned in choosing primarily Intelligence personnel instead of infantrymen and heavily armed Marines. In delaying final departure until 2100 hrs, he had to operate in the darkness of night on a poorly mapped shoreline, thus complicating the effort to recognize land features that would have permitted the patrol to come ashore at the planned location, instead of overshooting the objective to the east. One might ask why the Japanese prisoner's protests were ignored (despite the interpreter's presence) as they approached the beach. Col. Goettge had prepared for the situation he expected; he was not prepared for the unexpected, and that appears to have been a tragically myopic mistake.

The consequences of error are tragic, but it was Col. Goettge’s hope to minimize losses on both sides by providing some of the Japanese with an opportunity to surrender and to gather useful information. Beyond that, he hoped to move promptly to exploit the valuable intelligence that the enemy troops could provide, thus minimizing Marine casualties in the days ahead, bringing the battle on Guadalcanal to a quicker conclusion.

Col. Goettge was reportedly a very competent, experienced officer who apparently made a mistake in night navigation and/or judgment. Warfare is often unforgiving or error. I respect his intention and deeply regret the loss of good Marines, but I will offer no criticism of the colonel.

In a division-sized engagement against a tenacious enemy, the loss of 22 Marine lives would seem a small but tragic piece of a much larger and more chaotic mosaic. The battles of the southwest Pacific in World War II…indeed, the history of the Marine Corps…is written in the blood of good Marines and corpsmen, and underscored by the blood of their enemies. Yet, every loss is tragic to their families, friends, and to brother and sister Marines. We celebrate victories with the sobering realization that there is a price for each of them, and we learn from mistakes so that fewer losses will be suffered in the future. Tactics change to continually adapt to new weapons and resources.

Guadalcanal was the 1st Marine Division’s first trial by fire as a division. The lessons were costly but they were not lost, and the tradition has been upheld in every conflict since 1942. The Marines of 1st MarDiv, the Blue Diamond, continue to live up to their motto, “No better friend, no worse enemy”.


1 Frank Goettge - military.wikia,.com

2 Quantico Sentry Online, Marine sword linked to football legend,

3 Ibid.

4 Leatherneck: Star-crossed Translator, story by Dick Camp


6 Letter, Colonel William J. Whaling to Commandant Marine Corps, 26 January 1949. The matter of warning given to Goettge prior to his departure was confirmed by Lieutenant Colonel Lyman D. Spurlock in an interview held 27 January 1949.

7 Missing Marines, Denzil Ray Caltrider, posted July 30, 2012

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 The Sun Stood Still, Chapter 15, by Don Richter

11 Leatherneck: Star-crossed Translator, story by Dick Camp

12 USMC Monograph, The Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 60

13 The Sun Stood Still, Chapter 15, by Don Richter

14 Letter, Silvertsen to Commandant Marine Corps dated 17 February 1949

15 Missing Marines, Colonel Frank Bryan Goettge, Account of Ore J. Marion, posted July 1, 2012

16 Missing Marines, Colonel Frank Bryan Goettge, Account of Ernest Snowden, posted July 1, 2012

17 Missing Marines, Colonel Frank Bryan Goettge, Account of Thurman Miller, posted July 1, 2012

18 Pacific Wrecks website:


Ed Palumbo (author) from Tualatin, OR on May 30, 2020:

MSgt. Guillen,

Thank you for reading and commenting. As you know, there are so many actions, so many incidents and people that have been largely overlooked...just by the sheer volume of information.


Ed Palumbo

Juan Guillen on May 29, 2020:

Thank you for sharing sir. Semper Fi!

-Juan N. Guillen


Ed Palumbo (author) from Tualatin, OR on February 05, 2020:

Thank you for reading and commenting, Colton. Guadalcanal presents us with a number of actions to study and lessons to learn. Though the nature of warfare remains unchanged through history, Guadalcanal was a bold move in its time, and the 1st MarDiv was not in an advantageous position. Then, as now, good Marines turned adversity into victory through their tenacity and audacity, but it was costly. The enemy was determined, and had no real experience dealing with American military personnel and tactics. Decades passed, we've learned hard lessons and we project power ashore differently now because we've learned hard lessons. The old methods of sending troops ashore in landing craft and Higgins boats has gone the way of the Dodo. Though the cost was high in the past, using troop transports and landing craft now would be so costly as to assure failure. We have learned, and our enemies continue to study us so we'll have to keep learning, keep evolving, Respect from a brother Marine.

Semper Fidelis.


Colton on February 04, 2020:


That was a very in-depth History lesson of one of the many battles on Guadalcanal. War is chaotic and intense. The Marines and

Sailor’s lost in wars past and present will be with us Historically. Adapt and Overcome to an obstacle there is Once a Marine, Always a Marine Semper Fi!!!!

Ed Palumbo (author) from Tualatin, OR on September 23, 2014:

Thank you, UnnamedHarald - Having read a few of your Hubs, I genuinely appreciate your words. Best wishes,


David Hunt from Cedar Rapids, Iowa on September 23, 2014:

Edward, I am amazed at the amount of research you must have put into this article. It seems evident it was a labor of love. There was so much (well, nearly all of it) that I was unaware of. I believe that many times a focus near the personal level reveals aspects of the big picture that otherwise are missed. Well done. Voted up, interesting and shared.

Ed Palumbo (author) from Tualatin, OR on September 15, 2014:

Geoffrey, I hope your pursuit of the master's degree is successfully and promptly accomplished. Thank you for being a valued resource to me, and for keeping the memory of missing Marines alive.


Geoffrey on September 15, 2014:

Mr Palumbo / Mr Wolschlager,

I run the website which Mr. Palumbo cites several times in his (excellent) article. I'm also currently pursuing a master's degree in military history, and am hoping to include the Goettge patrol as part of my thesis about combat burials on Guadalcanal.

Mr. Wolshlager, we've corresponded before about your great-uncle Sergeant Stanfill, but I regret that I have mislaid your email address. Would you possibly send a copy of your interview with Sergeant Arndt to I would love to cite it for my thesis.

Thank you,


Ed Palumbo (author) from Tualatin, OR on September 10, 2014:

Mr. Wolschlager, I am definitely interested, and I'd be indebted for any information you may provide. One of my primary e-mail addresses is sixgill at comcast dot net and I would cite you as a source for any information I use. Thank you. Ed

David Wolschlager on September 09, 2014:

If you are interested I'd be glad to send you some info via email I have compiled over the years. If you can send your email to me on this posting then delete the post if you don't want your email revealed after 24 hrs. I have some photos, hand signed document (original) with Goettge's signature and possibly a copy of the interview which is being formatted. If not worries. DW

Ed Palumbo (author) from Tualatin, OR on September 09, 2014:

Mr. Wolfschlager, based on your conversation with Mr. Arndt, I deleted the sentence that Col Goettge's watch and rank insignia were removed by Sgt. Few and two other Marines. It doesn't affect the article or the outcome. I also doubt Mr. Arndt could forget or overlook such a detail, but I'm well aware that (in the retelling) it may have been presumed or assumed. Thank you for that correction. I send best wishes and hope you use the tapes and information you've collected to write Mr. Arndt.

David Wolschlager on September 09, 2014:

Mr. Palumbo, If I implied I felt YOU took creative license I offer my apologies. I feel this article is very well done and that your work is not a disservice to the Patrol's memory. In fact your work is a CREDIT to those Marines who gave all they had to give that night. I know there are many like myself that appreciate your efforts to tell their story. The details Sgt. Arndt spoke of were details others before you have included years and years ago and they seem to linger on. There are details that may have been embellished long ago and just can't be substantiated now. More than likely in total most are inconsequential. Just one example, I asked Arndt directly that historians have recorded that Arndt, Spaulding and Few removed the watch and rank insignia on his lapel once Goettge's dead body was found. "that never happened" he response was "what? ... it's mentioned many places that occurred..that's not right?" this was not his direct quote here but word's to the effect...."we didn't have time for that... Few was jumped.... we had to leave the Colonel and get back to the beach" Now 75 years later we ask ourselves...does this mean much? Maybe not. Could SGT Arndt be wrong? I suppose we ALL can be wrong sometimes especially in a stressful situation. Do I believe him? Absolutely I do. How did details such as this get included in a story an eyewitness refutes? I don't know and neither did he but as far as he was concerned, No way that happened. If he's wrong...I'll stand with him and be wrong too. I'm flattered you'd read my article or book (if I'd write one) but that probably wont be happening. I was fortunate enough to video tape many hours of our conversations about WWII and his time in Korea (Chosin Reservoir) that are pure gold. Arndt was a hero, Silver Star recipient, Scout Sniper, Marine Corps Distinguished Marksman (he told me was one of his proudest achievements) he was a true southern gentleman...

A prince of a man & missed to this day by many.

Ed Palumbo (author) from Tualatin, OR on September 09, 2014:

Mr. Wolschlager, I envy your advantage to have spoken with the survivors. It was my intent to consolidate the details of the event through research. If my effort fell short, I assure you I meant no disservice to the fallen or to the survivors. There are opinions or deductions I refrained from writing because I wasn't there and had no personal contact with those who were, so I refrained from "creative license" and presupposition. If lines were blurred, my cited sources may have done so in respect for the deceased and the living. My purpose was to better understand, and to keep the memory of this incident alive. I would hope a study of tactical errors will minimize losses, and I don't want to overlook the human element. I had formed an opinion but, as I have written, I offer no criticism of Col. Goettge. As for his combat experience, my sources discuss his background in WW1 with the 5th Marine Regiment against the Germans at St. Mihiel, but did not develop his role in that action. I look forward to your article or book to further my understanding. Semper Fidelis.

David Wolschlager on September 09, 2014:

SGT Robert James Stanfill (mentioned as killed in this article) was my great uncle. In addition I correspond with a member of SGT Stauffer's family (PA-USA) regularly and have contacted SGT. Fews nephew (AU.) on occasion. Before his death in 2009 I personally visited survivor SGT Charles Casper Arndt 3 times at his home in Mississippi, and once at my home in Florida to hear his eyewitness account of what took place at the Matanikau August 12/13, 1942. If here today Arndt would dispute SOME of the details here. Because this story has had decades of a few authors or researchers taking"creative license" to describe certain details some falsehoods may have crept in. In our conversations Arndt revealed to me some of details noted in the story here to his knowledge never happened. In fairness to him he was the first to be sent back so he was at the Matanikau the shortest time. In total I will say this article was a good read and is based in fact with little blurring of the lines of the story as told to me. My only opinion of Goettge is that he was no combat officer. He devised a flawed plan, ignored the warnings of his peers and got himself and many other Marines killed. Poor judgment. I appreciate this authors efforts to chronicle this unfortunate episode of Marine history. With articles like this they won't be forgotten. Semper Fi

Ed Palumbo (author) from Tualatin, OR on March 12, 2014:

With respect to you, your family and certainly to Cpl. Serdula. It is difficult to study this incident with 20/20 hindsight and an awareness of the tools and resources now at our disposal. Men like your great-uncle gave Marines of the next generation a lot to live up to, and I hoped to write this with respect.

Caitlin C. on March 12, 2014:

My Great Uncle is Steve Serdula! This is very well written and I love reading about him and what the team did. #GoAmerica

Ed Palumbo (author) from Tualatin, OR on February 15, 2014:

Thank you, Milo. I will always remember you as a motivated Marine who was up for anything, ready to risk, and calm under fire. You must remember, in 1966 I was a "diamond in the rough" and hadn't yet attended college classes. My writing and research improved with practice, but in '66-67 I had little more than a sense of humor. God bless you, Milo.

Ed Palumbo (author) from Tualatin, OR on February 15, 2014:

I am grateful to all readers and to brother Marines for their supportive comments. I owe it to them and to Marines who went before us to keep the memory alive and the record straight regarding the Goettge patrol. Other issues I'm researching will concern other actions, other branches of service, and I hope to keep faith with those about whom I write, because they deserve no less. on February 05, 2014:

Once again you have proven since 1966 that your abilitys were never fully used by the CORPS. YOU are a gifted writter with a nack for not only getting the details but making those details come alive.You inspire the reader to keep reading even after you have completed the story .



Gunnar on February 04, 2014:

This is a very interesting, well researched, and very well written piece of Marine Corps history. As with most disasters large or small this patrol had a disastrous result due to a culmination of events and decisions. Rarely does a major malfunction occur due to one factor and this is one more event to support that conclusion. I find it somewhat ironic that the First Sergeant's name was Custer.

"Coop" on February 04, 2014:

Well researched and very well written. This is the first I have read about the Goettage Patrol. Thanks to Ed Palumbo for a great article and sharing this history of brave Marines with us.

Semper Fi

Ez Ed on February 03, 2014:

Well researched and very well written. As an FMF Navy Corpsman ,I served with Marines of the First Marine Division both in the field and in a field hospital in S. Vietnam. I have read much about Guadalcanal and Marines in WWII But this is the first I have read about the Goettage Patrol. Thanks to Ed Palumbo for a great article and sharing this history of brave Marines with us.

Skip Coad on February 03, 2014:

Amazing research, well written, and very sad. Semper Fi

Ed Palumbo (author) from Tualatin, OR on February 02, 2014:

When first I heard of this incident, Goettge's officer leadership was called into question. In examining what I could find of him, I believe he was adequately prepared for what he expected (100-200 surrendering prisoners), but night navigation is difficult and often impossible; I believe a key landmark was missed in the darkness and they beached in the wrong place. Bloody mess, and costly…but his record as an officer and leader was excellent.

CJ Kelly from the PNW on February 02, 2014:

This was a very well balanced article on Goettge. It seems that almost every historian of the battle has either condemned Goettge or offered much criticism of his decisions. He was aggressive and the situation was still tenuous in those early days. Voted up.

Ed Palumbo (author) from Tualatin, OR on February 02, 2014:

This was an incident, one of a great many in a long war and a longer history, but I agree it was tragic for the Marines involved. Several were married men - Goettge, Cory, Caltrider and others. All were someone's son. We hope to conduct war with an economy of human misery, but war is war. Thank you for reading and commenting.

Tammy on February 02, 2014:

This article is well-researched and clearly explained. Such a tragic chapter in the long, honorable history of the US Marine Corps.

Ed Palumbo (author) from Tualatin, OR on February 02, 2014:

old albion, Thank you for reading it! This subject came up years ago, but only recently has more information become available.

Graham Lee from Lancashire. England. on February 02, 2014:

Absolutely first class. Your research is inspirational to your reader. It is difficult to pinpoint any part of your hub as being the 'best bit'. So much information, I felt I was on that beach as I read it. The Japanese atrocities were a disgrace. So well done!

voted up and all.


Related Articles